Category: Positive Psychology

  • Can money buy happiness?

    “Anybody who thinks money can’t buy happiness doesn’t know where to shop”- Unknown

    “Anybody who thinks money will make you happy, hasn’t got money.”  – David Geffen

    We humans are obsessed with money.  To many people, it’s a commodity in and of itself.  And it seems we’re gradually getting more obsessed.  In the 1960s, 80% of US college students said it was essential to develop a meaningful philosophy of life, and 40% said it was essential to be very well off financially.  By the mid-1990s, you could reverse those figures.

    It seems like many people just want money.  They don’t want to have made a product, provided a service or found some other way to offer value, and have their money reflect the value they have given.  They want money as the end goal, not particularly caring how it was obtained.

    Not all people are like that, of course, but a lot are.  And it’s quite natural that they are, given what people think money can do for them.  It’s the Holy Grail, isn’t it?   You get freedom, security, status. But do you get happiness?

    Yes!  And no.  It’s complicated.

    Money can buy happiness if you don’t have it to start with, and it’s subject to the law of diminishing returns.  It also depends how you spend it. I’ll explain in more detail.

    If you live in poverty, it’s likely that many of your basic physical needs aren’t being met.  You might not have an available food or water supply.  You might have inadequate shelter, warmth or safety. In these situations, money absolutely will make you happier.

    However, after a certain point, which is somewhere around $10-15k, money has a diminishing effect on happiness. Essentially, once you’re out of poverty and into the middle-class, extra money doesn’t buy much more happiness.  

    In 1985 the Forbes 100 wealthiest Americans, each with a net worth over $125m, had their happiness measured by psychologists, and their results turned out to be only slightly higher than the average for the country.  Think about that; the top 100 wealthiest people, out of however-many-millions, were only a little happier than average.
    However, when it comes to your bank balance, it’s not the size, but what you do with it that counts. Researchers have found that so-called ‘experiential purchases’, such as a meal out or theatre tickets, resulted in greater happiness than material purchases, like a big screen TV or new shoes. After a while we get used to these material possessions, even bored with them. If you spend £500 on a new TV, you’ll be happy for a while, but then you’ll adapt to it, and it will be the norm for you. When planned obsolescence brings the next technological advancement in television along, suddenly your TV is worse than the norm; it’s not good enough! On the other hand, you don’t adapt to an experience, and the more of them you have, the more ‘memory capital’ you build. Reminiscing on the good times makes people happier, and the more good times you’ve, had the more you have to reminisce on. This is not to mention the social bonds that you can develop through these experiences, which tend to be shared with friends or at least involve other people in some way.

    Furthermore, if you use your money to perform acts of kindness for others, it can increase your own happiness, as well as the receiver of your gift.  A researcher measured the happiness of a group of people, and then gave each of them some money, between $5-$20.  Some were asked to spend it on themselves, while some were told to spend it on others.  Then happiness was measured again, and it was the latter group who showed an increase.  

    So it seems how much money you earn isn’t as important as how you spend it.  Perhaps the famous quote at the start of this article should read: “those who think money can’t buy happiness, don’t know who to shop for”.

    Refs:

    Dey, E. L., Astin, A. W., & Korn, W. S. (1991). The American Freshman: Twenty-five year trends. Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles.

    Diener, E., Horwitz, J., & Emmons, R. A. (1985). Happiness of the very wealthy. Social Indicators, 16, 263-274.

    Dunn, E.W., Aknin, L., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending money on others promotes happiness. Science, 319, 1687-1688

  • Can happiness be measured?

    Can you measure your happiness like your temperature?  Is it possible to accurately say who is happier than who?  When I told people I was writing a chapter on measuring happiness, I got skeptical reactions.  A lot of people don’t see happiness as something that can be measured.  They say it’s too abstract, too subjective, too hard to quantify.  So if you’re skeptical, I don’t blame you, but hopefully I can convince you otherwise.

    Methods of measuring happiness range from deceptively simple to extremely complex.  The more complex the method, the more accurate the results are.  The simplest way is to just ask people how satisfied they are with their life on a scale of one to ten.  More complex ways range from questionnaires that are 20+ items long, to brain imaging scans using state-of-the-art technology.  In the middle-ground are the ‘life-satisfaction’ questionnaires; these measure the specific definition of happiness described in the last section, and that that’s the definition I’ll be using here.

    When we’re in a happy state, it’s something we can feel physically.  Now, we could find a way to measure that physical feeling somehow: maybe with brain scans, heart/pulse rates, or something like that.  We’d then get a nice, objective way of measuring happiness.  But the problem is, there may be a difference between the objective measurement of happiness and your subjective experience of it.

    For example, some people are real adrenaline junkies. They love bungee jumping, performing in front of crowds, and diving out of aeroplanes. Others can really do without that kind of thing.  An objective measurement can tell us the status of our physical body, but not necessarily how happy we are with that status.  Imagine believing you are happy but being assured that you are not, or vice versa; this seems OK for something like temperature, but incorrect for happiness.

    Therefore any measurement of a person’s happiness has to include their evaluation of their own state- we just need a way to quantify these evaluations.  This is why happiness is measured with questionnaires and scales – you’d miss important information if you measured it only as a physical feeling.

    Sources of static when measuring happiness

    The way to measure these evaluations is to use a specially designed questionnaire. Going over the process of how these questionnaires is designed is beyond the scope of this book, but it involves starting with lots of potential questions and finding the best combination through many studies and lots of statistical analysis. But once they are made, the problem of accuracy comes up; are people good judges of their happiness?  The problem is a slippery one, because we’re rejecting a purely objective definition of happiness.  We’re in the realm of subjectivity, where happiness cannot be completely separated from peoples’ own standards.

    Imagine two completely identical people, in two completely identical alternate universes.  They have the exact same lives, experiences and feelings, in every single way, except one; one of them is more pessimistic in his judgement of his life.  Our subjective measurement would show him as being less happy, but is he really less happy than his alternate self?

    In one sense he cannot be- he has the exact same life, experiences the same good emotions, and feels the same amount of pleasure.  On the other hand, if his pessimism means he wants more, shouldn’t that dissatisfaction be included when measuring his happiness?

    In other words, shouldn’t people choose their own criteria of what they’re happy with?  They should, but standards can be fickle.  Today I’m happy with my house, tomorrow I want a bigger one.  Maybe the day after that I don’t want a big house anymore.  Our happiness measurement would detect these fluctuations; like static picked up along with the ‘signal’ of happiness we’re trying to tap into.

    This is not such a bad thing.  The way we consistently judge our lives affects our feelings of happiness.  If you regularly use a higher standard to judge your situation by than what you have achieved, you’ll get less happy.  This is called negative self-talk and it’s what some types of therapy work at fixing.  Likewise, if you lower your standards of judgement, you’ll tend to get happier with what you have; this is generally known as appreciation or gratitude.

    There are other sources of static too, like ‘impression management’.  If someone going on a date asked you for advice, you’d be quite a troublemaker if you suggested they be as unhappy as possible.  Happy, positive people are more attractive, so you might expect people to report a happiness score that they view as being attractive.  This explains why you get higher happiness scores if you do surveys by interview than by post, and even more so if the interviewer is of the opposite sex!

    Mood might also cause some static.  Imagine being asked how satisfied you are with your life when you’ve just had the best day of your life, compared with your worst.  You’d probably be rational to a point, because you’re specifically being asked to look at your life overall, but the way your day went would definitely have an impact.

    These sources of static cast a shadow of doubt of the measurements.  We need some more objective things to compare our scores with, to make sure that the signal coming through the static is strong enough.

    Cleaning up the Signal

    To find out how much signal is getting through the static, the questionnaires of happiness must be compared with objective things that already we know are related to happiness.  Because such a large amount of research has been done in this area, I’ll only give a quick overview of this work.

    First of all, if you give someone a happiness questionnaire twice, one month apart, the results are very similar. This consistency shows that people don’t just respond randomly, and it suggests there is more to the results than people’s mood at the time of answering. Of course we would not expect the results to be identical, because many things can happen in a month, but we would expect a correlation.

    Emotions and feelings are processed in the brain, so that’s another good place to look.  As you probably know, the brain is split up into two hemispheres.  You might not know, that the left hemisphere is associated with positive emotions and feelings, and the right hemisphere with negative ones (to be specific, the left- and right-prefrontal cortices).  If you record brain activity when people watch funny films, the left side lights up; during sad films, the right side activates.  People with injuries to the left side are more likely to become depressed, and people with damage on the right side can actually get an increase in good feelings. So how do happiness questionnaires compare with brain scans?  Well, it turns out that people who score higher on happiness questionnaires actually have more activity in the left hemisphere. (3) So these questionnaires are related in the correct way to brain activation – another sign that they do what they are supposed to.

    As mentioned previously, there’s a chance people might lie when completing these questionnaires, and say they’re happier than they are to give a good impression.  This can be tested for by asking friends, family and independent observers to fill out the questionnaire as if they were the person in question.  My friends and family would know if I’m happy, and random people would have some idea.  They wouldn’t get the same exact score as me of course, because they aren’t me (so few of us are in fact).  But for happiness measurements to be taken seriously, they have to correlate with friend and observer reports – and they do.

    Another objective thing to compare against is the ultimate symbol of happiness – the smile.  Look at the picture below:

    A ‘real’ smile, called a ‘Duchenne’ smile, is where the eyes wrinkle up on the outside along with the smile.  If someone isn’t smiling with the eyes, they’re probably faking it. See the crow’s feet on the guy’s eyes, indicating a real smile. The girl is only smiling with the lips – no crow’s feet = not a real smile.  As you’d expect, people with higher happiness scores tend to give more Duchenne smiles than people with lower scores.

    Hey, it works!

    Even though it might have seemed far fetched to measure an abstract thing like happiness, with a questionnaire, of all things, there really is a signal coming through the static.  All the evidence points to that signal being happiness; or at least, something it’s logical to label ‘happiness’.  It’s not a perfect method, but the signal to noise ratio is good enough that these questionnaires can be useful.

  • What is happiness?

    How would you define happiness? Is it an emotion? A state of mind? A decision? Is it a reaction to things that happen to us, like pain, or is it something we can create ourselves? It’s tough to define happiness, because it’s a very abstract, subjective concept. Whatever it is though, it’s a powerful motivator – almost everything we do is motivated by how much happiness we think we’ll get from it.

    Even though happiness has such a big role in our lives, we don’t seem to spend much time thinking about what it is. Most people just take it for granted, but others haven’t been satisfied with that; philosophers have been pondering on happiness for thousands of years, and in the last couple of decades, scientists have been studying it too. All of this work has given new insight into what happiness is, why it’s there, and most importantly, how to get
    it.

    Everyone intuitively knows what happiness feels like, and people are also quite good at telling you what will make them happy. Try asking them. You’ll probably get responses involving money or the opposite sex, but if you’re lucky you might get a more thoughtful response. If you’re very lucky, you might get some good ideas for future Christmas presents. If you ask what happiness actually is, however, you get less detailed replies and the occasional blank face. People don’t ponder this, because it doesn’t seem like useful information for everyday life.

    So what is it?

    Well for starters, there’s a strong element of subjectivity to happiness. Different things elicit it for different people. Listening to 80s power ballads might make me happy, but not you. OK bad example, everybody loves power ballads. But you get my point. So when trying to form a definition of happiness, it’s best not to focus on the specifics of what causes it in different people – there’d be too much information to make sense of any of it. Instead, we have to look at what all these different things have in common. The most obvious commonality is pleasure. If you find bike rides, massages or films pleasurable, then you’d probably agree that these things make you happy. Also if you think of the last time you were really happy, you’d probably say it was pleasurable. But
    despite what my ex-girlfriend might claim, pleasure isn’t always a short-lived thing. You could distinguish between short-term but intense pleasure, like elation or excitement, and more enduring but less intense feelings, like contentedness, relaxation, or the feeling that you are part of something meaningful, bigger than yourself.

    And what’s the hidden commonality behind short-term and long-term pleasure? It’s that something, or things in general, are going better than might be expected – or better than some alternative. So it seems reasonable to include pleasant feelings somewhere in the definition of happiness. I mean, it’s hard to imagine the opposite, pain, being part of it. Or is it? Can you think of an example of when a person could be in pain but be happy? (That doesn’t involve PVC and whips, thank you very much…). What about if a climber fell off a cliff but survived? He might be in great pain while he recovered in hospital, but at the same time be happy to be alive.

    Happiness is more than just a feeling

    The man who survives falling off a cliff can’t feel happiness at the same time as the agonising pain, but on judgement, comparing his situation to a grim alternative, he might be happy with it. There are many other examples and counter-examples you might think of, but one thing seems clear; it’s possible to be happy without feeling happy. Look at it this way; if I say ‘I am happy to see you!’, I’m talking about a feeling (well, either that or I’m lying). If I say ‘I am happy with my life’, I’m not talking about a feeling, I’m making a judgement.

    Why? Because I can completely experience the event ‘seeing you’, whereas I can’t experience ‘all my life’ at once. All I can do is compare all the positive feelings I tend to have with all the negative feelings I experience. Or maybe I’d compare my current situation with some expectation I hold. Either way, my happiness when seeing you is something, it exists in some physical way. My happiness with my life does not exist as such; it only reflects things that do exist (or did).

    So there’s something else to happiness beyond mere feelings, something cognitive. It’s not really a valid question to say which one of these two things – positive feelings or positive judgements – ‘is’ happiness; they are different levels of the same thing. If you define happiness as a feeling, you would conclude that happiness is erratic; shifting up and down, minute-by-minute, in response to whatever is going on (or not going on). Your conclusion would be correct, but limited, because you would not know whether a person is happy with all the ups and downs.

    For example, one couple in a volatile relationship might like the drama. Another couple might enjoy a relatively boring but stress-free life. But on balance, both couples might be equally happy with their relationship (although each will not understand how the other can be!).

    Because feelings and judgements are two levels of the same thing you would expect there to be some overlap. And there is. This is why you get people saying ‘happiness is a decision’ or a ‘happiness is a state of mind’. By deliberately altering judgements, the part of feelings that overlaps with it will start to change too. You see this in people who take cognitive-behavioural therapy; they learn judge situations in a different way, and it’s about as effective as prozac at making people happier, given enough time. Likewise, it’s natural that if you do a lot of things that result in the feelings of happiness, then over time this will affect your judgements of how happy you are. That’s quite obvious; when you sit and reflect you’ll have more happy memories on which to base your judgement.

    Scientists have focused their work mostly on the judgement definition. They prefer to study things that are stable over time: if feelings were used, the research would be all over the place. Also, judgements are a higher-level definition; judgements can tell you about feelings, but feelings can’t necessarily tell you about judgements.
    Psychologists have termed judgements ‘Subjective Well Being’, or ‘life-satisfaction.’ They’ve also come up with other definitions and explanations for happiness, but this subjective well being is the one with the most research behind it. So I’ll focus on that one in this book, but I’ll continue to just call it happiness for consistency.
    The real advantage defining happiness in this way is that it gets around the subjectivity problem. When you judge your life, you take into account the things that make you happy, and when I judge my life, I take the things that make me happy into account. If we are able to use our own judging criteria, we could compare our happiness, if there was some way to measure it. Well there is, and in the next section we’ll look at how it is been possible to quantify happiness.

  • Is Emotional Intelligence really an intelligence?

    Some people argue that Emotional Intelligence is actually a set of skills. This makes me think, why is it called emotional intelligence, and not Emotional Skill, or something like that? Is it really an intelligence? Or if a set of skills can form an “emotional intelligence”, then can any set of skills be considered an intelligence?

    Intelligence is “the ability to carry out abstract thought, as well as the general ability to learn and adapt to the environment.” (Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, 2004, p198). Most researchers now refute the concept of ‘g’ – a common general factor that influences intelligence in each domain – which is what we generally think of when we think intelligence. Also the concept of IQ seems very narrow and misses out on a range of behaviours that you might intuitively consider to be indicative of intelligence. Currently, researchers seem to favour the idea of multiple intelligences, that each cover different domains separately, one of which being emotional intelligence, but we also have social intelligence, IQ, verbal intelligence, spatial intelligence, and so on.

    What distinguishes these intelligences from each other? And does emotional intelligence fit the bill, or is it better considered only as a set of skills? According to Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004) intelligences…

    * Process a distinct type of information

    Emotional intelligence certainly ticks this box. Emotions are conveyed not only verbally, but through our body language, behaviour, and facial expressions; and in the latter case, the information appears to be a human universal, consistent across culture (Ekman, 2003). Whether you go to modern, pre-industrial, or tribal societies, everyone smiles when happy, frowns when sad, etc. It’s a common ‘language’.

    * Must be operationalised in a ‘test’ format, for which there are more-or-less right answers

    If we take an IQ test, there is one correct answer to each question. I took the MSCEIT (an EI test; see Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios, 2003) a while back, and I definitely didn’t see that – not through the whole test.

    There was one section in particular, which Andy Roberts of Breath London who was administering my feedback, said is frequently questioned.

    There were a load of pictures, for instance, a bunch of grey squares, and you had to answer “How much happiness is shown in this picture?”, and things like that. Is there really a right or wrong answer to that?

    Another one was a picture of a rock in a lake. Maybe I’m missing something, but how can that be happy? Its a rock in a lake. Apparently there is a right answer, which is judged by consensus and expert criteria. I’m sorry, but I don’t care how many people think that a rock is happy – it isn’t. And who can be an expert on the happiness of rocks in lakes? Or are we supposed to say how happy it makes us? Because what if rocks in lakes just don’t make me smile? Does that mean I can’t recognise happiness in people? On the other hand, if it’s measured by consensus, are we sure that identifying the happiness shown by a rock in a lake carries over to identifying emotions in people. For example, would people with average EI give a different score to people with high EI? How would we know?

    However, the other items on the test such as facial expression and emotion name recognition, certainly would have closer associations with actual emotional expression (and clearer right/wrong answers).

    * Shows patterns of correlations similar to other intelligences

    Apparently EI is ‘factorally unified’ and correlates modestly with other intelligences. So it’s a distinct construct but at the same time you wouldn’t necessarily expect someone very high in EI to be very low in, say verbal intelligence.

    By the way, if you’re wondering why intelligences can correlate, but we can’t find ‘g’, a general factor of intelligence, read this page, for a comprehensive explanation. To quote the author “This doubtless more than exhausts your interest in reading about the subject; it has certainly exhausted my interest in writing about it.”

    * It should develop with age

    According to Mayer, Salovey and Caruso, (2004), there is evidence that EI develops with age, which meets the third criteria for an intelligence.

    So it looks like EI does tick all the boxes – not completely inside the lines – but mostly so. Which isn’t to say that it’s not a set of skills – after all you could break down an IQ test into various cognitive skills – but it’s not only that.

    By the way, Bob Sternberg, the big name in intelligence research, the guy who made the call for the study of multiple intelligences back in the 1980s, also of triangular theory of love fame, has a very interesting definition of intelligence:

    “I define [intelligence] as your skill in achieving whatever it is you want to attain in your life within your sociocultural context, by capitalizing on your strengths and compensating for, or correcting, your weaknesses.”

    I’ve talked about strengths and weaknesses a lot. Perhaps, some years down the line there will be a strengths intelligence – the ability we have to recognise our personal strengths into our every day lives. Maybe when the strengths models are better developed, we will be able to compare them against the criteria for an intelligence.

    How much strength is shown by this rock in a lake?

    References:

    Ekman, P. (2003). Emotions Revealed, NY: H. Holt

    Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2004). Emotional intelligence: Theory, findings, and implications. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 197-215.

    Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R., & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring emotional intelligence with the MSCEIT V2.0. Emotion, 3, 97-105.

  • Who needs self-esteem anyway?

    I discovered an interesting paper by Ryan and Brown (1), which got me thinking. This paper proposes a view of self-esteem that I hadn’t come across before.

    First, they explain their view of the self. Most researchers use the ‘self-as-object’ definition – we have a self-concept, which can be complex, simple, positive or negative based on our own appraisal and evaluation of it. These evaluative ‘schema’ make up self-esteem.

    A second perspective is the ‘self-as-process’ idea, in which the self is not the object of evaluation, but is the process of assimilating and integrating experience. From this perspective, it is not important whether self-esteem is low or high; what is important is what is going on when these evaluations are made.

    Staying with the self-determination theory (SDT) tradition, they argue from the self-as-process position that concern with the worth of the self is a byproduct of psychological need deprivation. In other words, most people don’t sit around thinking “How worthy am I?”; yet many other people obsess over this, and compare themselves continuously. The fact that they do this, Ryan and Brown propose, means there is a psychological need unfulfilled (the three psychological needs being relatedness to others, autonomy, and competence).

    For example, an individual lacking in relatedness with others may try to conform to the standards of other people in order to gain their acceptance. They might get it, but the quest for self-esteem hinders their authenticity and personal growth. Likewise, a person may seek self-esteem in achievement, if they are insecure about their competence.

    So if one has self-esteem, it is because their basic psychological needs are fulfilled. Therefore self-esteem can be beneficial to an individual – but only if they don’t need it! Seeking self-esteem it for its own sake may lead to conflicts in the basic needs, and therefore only temporary satisfaction.

    Ryan and Brown suggest, based on this, that a life lived without concern for self-esteem might be optimal. When something bad happens, we are disappointed, but we do not integrate this into our self-concept and disparage ourselves (“I’m a loser!”). Likewise, when things go well, we are pleased, but again the self is not conceptualised as an object to be praised (“I’m awesome!”).

    This phenomenon of not integrating positive or negative events with the self may be related to another interesting construct – locus of evaluation. This is the degree that an individual has integrated a set of standards or values by which to judge their actions, versus the extent that they rely on an external frame of reference. For example, if I had an internal locus of evaluation for blog writing, it would not matter how much traffic or tweets I got from this post – I do not judge my performance on that, so it would not affect me. Conversely, if I had an external locus of evaluation, I would be highly affected by the traffic I got, for I would need that external reference to know how well I did.

    An external locus of evaluation is correlated with low self-esteem (2), just as the theories of SDT and self-esteem would predict: the need for another person to set the standard for our self-evaluations is a hallmark of the introjected style of motivation – this indicates the deprivation of a psychological need, and hence low self-esteem.

    You can envision a dark side to an internal locus of evaluation too; if your own judgement is just plain wrong, for instance. But, in any case, this just seems to deflect the issue; if an internal locus of evaluation is a buffer protecting self-esteem, it would preserve both the positive and negative forms of self-esteem alike. The problem seems to be with the concept of the self itself.

    To take this further, Ryan and Brown bring in ideas from Buddhist philosophy, which go something like this: when we form a self-concept (self-as-object) we often forget that this ‘me’ is merely a creation of thought, and is only one of an infinite number of possible ways that we can construe the self.

    We know there is some truth to this idea from CBT and Seligman’s explanatory style of optimism – our self-concept, our self-esteem, the emotions we experience – even mental disorder in some cases – can be traced back to particular thoughts, beliefs and judgements we hold of ourselves.

    Here’s the point: if the self can be constructed in any number of ways – which appears to be the case – is this really the self that we want ourselves and others to esteem? Perhaps the fickleness of the self-as-object construction is the reason that self-esteem is not a reliable route to well-being or growth.

    But if not these constructions, then what? Is there a deeper ‘self’, beneath these constructions? Mindfulness is proposed as an answer – as long as we hold to a construction of the self-as-object to esteem, there will always be situations where we do not live up to the values on which the self is based. The idea is to disidentify with the self-as-object, and simply to have awareness of the processes that the self is made up of, without ever saying “That is me.”

    And coming full circle, this is in accordance with the idea of healthy self-regulation – someone who has their basic psychological needs met, does not strive for self-esteem.

    References:

    (1) Ryan, R., & Brown, K. (2003). Why We Don’t Need Self-Esteem: On Fundamental Needs, Contingent Love, and Mindfulness: Comment. Psychological Inquiry, 14(1), 71-76

    (2) Bucus, D. (2008). Defining the self: Locus of evaluation, self-esteem, and personality. Dissertation Abstracts International Section A, 69, 122.

  • Can humour be learned?

    How many therapists does it take to change a lightbulb? Only one, but it takes six months and the bulb has to want to change!

    Humour has a potentially valuable place in therapy; a large number of papers argue for the benefits of it in a therapeutic setting. There is also a lot of information about humour styles out there, and what type of humour is appropriate in different settings.

    BUT… is there any work on how to teach humour skills to professionals? It’s alright to advise a talk therapist to “use humour,” but humour could potentially have a severely negative effect too, if used ineffectively. So it seems that proper training may be needed.

    And also, in a broader sense, humour is useful in sales, business, teaching; even in romance! So what about general humour training? We have comedy improv clubs and what-not, and these might be effective in their own way, but it’s not going to convince the scientists and practitioners to go to a comedy club to help their patients. For that, there would need to be theoretical papers, randomised controlled trials, and so on, which is ironic since these are some of the least amusing things you’re likely to come across. But I decided to see if there was any science in this area. Can humour be learned, or is it just a gift?

    The Controlled Trial

    “When I first said I wanted to be a comedian, everybody laughed. They’re not laughing now.” – Bob Monkhouse

    As I looked through the research, unfortunately, I found very few studies. I managed to found one controlled test of a humour training intervention. Nevo, Aharonson, and Klingman (1) subjected 101 female teachers to a 20-hour humour training program, consisting of 14 individual units. At the end of the test, the treatment group saw greater improvements in measures of ‘humour production’ as rated by peers, compared to pre-test measurements and the control group. And subjectively, the participants felt that the program was moderately effective. So it does seem from this one study, that humour can be learned.

    An interesting finding, however, was that ‘trait-level’ measures of humour were less sensitive to changes following the program; which might question how long these benefits last for. Maybe you have to keep practising to keep your game up.

    The Uncontrolled Trial

    McGhee (2) devised an 8 week humour development program, aimed at the lay audience. Franzini (3) mentions that this program is backed by a self-report follow up, but as yet I have not found it. If anyone knows of it, please let me know.

    General skill or scripted sessions?

    humour_in_therapy
    The local yoga club was in high spirits, despite the horrific Superglue accident. (credit: lululemon athletica)

    Here’s another point – do we train professionals in humour production, then let them loose on their clients? Or do we systematically develop a set of lines and comments, a sort of therapists jokebook, that are tested and proven to be funny, appropriate, non-triggering, and so on? By doing so, we might increase the ‘hit-rate’ of the humour, but we may lose a certain authenticity to the interaction’s normal, organic flow. Carl Rogers and others have suggested that an authentic relationship between client and counsellor is an essential part of the therapeutic process – structured humour may get in the way of this. But in other fields this may work well.

    Theoretical benefits of studying humour training

    As well as looking for practical benefits in applied settings, there might be other uses to studying humour training. One in particular could be in linking the findings with the evolutionary fields. Evolutionary psychologists have been trying to find the adaptive function of humour and laughter for a while, and they’ve focused a lot of attention on attraction.

    They suggest that humour evolved, essentially, as a way of attracting a mate by displaying the health of your brain and your immunity to social pressure through your fantastic wit, hence making your genes something of a commodity to members of the opposite sex.

    So far, researchers have found certain types of humour to be more attractive than others; self-depricating humour is apparently the best one, as long as you’re already high-status (4). If you’re not already seen as high-status, self-depricating humour has the opposite effect on your perceived attractiveness (these researchers are also to be commended for the use of the word “diss” in the title of a scientific paper). But if humour training can be measured somehow, this would be better way to test these theories too – for example are people viewed as more attractive, so they meet more partners, etc., after a humour training program, all other things being equal?

    Overall, there is little research in this area, despite many papers noting the benefits of humour in a range of professional and personal settings, and this could be a fruitful area for future study.

    References:

    (1) Nevo, O., Aharonson, H., & Klingman, A. (1998). The development and evaluation of a systematic program for improving sense of humor. In W Ruch (Ed.), The sense of humor: Explorations of a personality characteristic (pp.385-404). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

    (2) McGhee, P.E. (1994). How to develop your sense of humour: An 8 step humour development training program. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt.

    (3) Franzini, Louis (2001). Humor in Therapy: The Case for Training Therapists in Its Uses and Risks. The journal of General Psychology, 128(2), 170-193.

    (4) Greengross, G., & Miller, G.F. (2008). Dissing Oneself versus Dissing Rivals: Effects of Status, Personality, and Sex on the Short-Term and Long-Term Attractiveness of Self-Deprecating and Other-Deprecating Humor. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 6(3), 393-408.

  • The evolution of optimism

    There is a lot of information out there about the benefits of optimism in numerous areas of life. The research shows that optimists aren’t necessarily blind to the world, seeing it with rose-tinted glasses, which is a common criticism of books and programs aimed at developing optimism in people. In fact, optimism seems to be in many cases a highly desirable decision making or belief strategy. And being optimistic implies a positive anticipation of a desired outcome; sometimes when all the evidence points to a different one occurring.

    Rather than writing the “10 steps to optimism”, I want to look into this a little more deeply. Why have we evolved the ability to think this way? Surely the best way to guide behaviour would be to hold beliefs that are as accurate as possible, and making decisions based on them. I would have assumed that these would be the most accurate decisions you could make. So you might argue that natural selection would tend towards accurate thinking, but this doesn’t match up with the evidence base on optimism or other cognitive biases (or simply the experience of being human).

    To explain the ultimate origin of optimism, it is necessary to figure out whether having a system in the brain that allows for overly favourable perception or cognition can be beneficial to survival or reproduction, and also to see how the system would relates to other ideas in evolutionary theory.

    To give a specific example, consider the tendency of men to overestimate the sexual interest of women (1). This is of course an adaptive strategy, because male reproduction is limited only by the number of partners they can meet, and since it costs little or nothing to ‘try it on’, being optimistic and assuming the best means fewer missed opportunities. Natural selection would therefore favour men who are optimistic about women’s interest in them, as opposed to those with accurate perceptions.

    This balance of costs and benefits is how optimism is said to have evolved. In a situation where a caveman or cavewoman has to make a decision, but they are uncertain about the outcome, sometimes they are going to get it wrong. But, is it more costly to make false positive errors, or false negative errors? This problem is called error management theory (1), and it ties in nicely with the idea of positive illusions, which we’ve discussed before in the context of relationships.

    Taylor and Brown (2) propose that positive illusions help motivate people to pursue goals with a low objective level of success, such as the terminally ill individual whose positive illusion about the disease leads her to positive health behaviours.

    In such a situation (and in others), optimism and pessimism can lead to different negative outcomes – optimism might lead to wasting time and energy in pursuits that are not beneficial, and pessimism might lead to passivity and missing out on potential opportunities.

    Reasoning forward we can see a route through which optimism can evolve in a world where the outcomes of decisions are often uncertain – if the cost of trying and failing is low (compared to the benefit of succeeding), then optimism is the best strategy – better, even, than a decision that is made on accurate information (3).

    Coming back to increasing chances of survival and reproduction, we find that positive illusions tend to be aimed toward the self, and particularly about characteristics that other people find desirable – when asked about others, the illusions disappear (4) – with the exception of our positive illusions towards our romantic partners; but we’ve seen that these are ultimately self-serving as they help sustain the relationship.

    Likewise, pessimism is thought to have evolved by the same pressure of natural selection, but this time acting on a different area of the brain. This allows for variation in the things we can be optimistic and pessimistic about, depending on the particular situation (see reference 3 for more info on this).

    Recommended Reading

    References:

    (1)Haselton, M. G. & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A new perspective on biases in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 81-91.

    (2) Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-201.

    (3) Haselton, M., & Nettle, D. (2005). The paranoid optimist: An integrative evolutionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(1), 47-66

    (4) Campbell, J. D. (1986). Similarity and uniqueness: The effects of attribute type, relevance and individual differences in self-esteem and depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 281-294.

  • Can we develop psychological resilience through physical activity?

    Psychological ‘resilience’ refers to the differences between people in how they respond to and cope with difficult or stressful experiences. People who are highly resilient would be less affected, recover more quickly, and/or might actually find such events to be growth experiences. For people low in resilience, the opposite would be true.

    Now here’s something to think about: many popular books and articles have mentioned the increases in mental disorder such as stress and depression over the last century, at least in the modern world. And if you think about it, there does seem to be a trend in which, as time has gone by, we’ve increased our use of technology to the effect that we physically move around much less.

    Could it be that there is a causal relationship here, that our lack of movement has reduced our psychological resilience to stress? And by becoming more active, could we increase our resilience?

    Stress

    In a sense, everything that we do involves stress. Even just reading this sentence is placing a particular demand on your brain, so what is important here is how we respond a particular stressor. Stress is also important for growth – our bodies are adaptive and generally respond to stress by becoming more able to deal with it; provided that stress is not too high. For example, doing bicep curls with 100kg would probably be too much stress and lead to injury, but 10kg might be enough stress to increase strength.

    So you could argue that placing the body under moderate amounts of stress could, over time, lead to lowered stress responses to future events, but the important point is whether resilience to the stress of exercise carries over to stress caused by other events (eg, in the workplace, traffic jams, etc).

    Exercise

    resilience_and_exercise
    Two great ways to get some exercise: Walk the invisible dog, and handshake the invisible man. (Credit: mikebaird)

    In one study, researchers put one group of participants on a 10-week walking and jogging program, and left another to continue their normal sedentary lifestyle. At the end of the program, the exercise group scored lower on state and trait anxiety, as well as less tension and fatigue. These factors could contribute to lowered stress responses to future events, however this was not tested directly, and additionally only 16 participants per group took part, and you’d typically want a minimum of 30, preferably more, to get a solid finding. (1)

    In another study, the effects of aerobic, weight, and no training on responses to a fiendishly stressful situation were compared. Participants had to answer mental arithmetic puzzles, which flashed up on a screen too fast to complete, while listening to distracting conversations involving numbers.

    Those who had undergone the aerobic training had reduced heart-rate and systolic blood-pressure responses relative to the control group (the weight training group only had improvements in systolic blood-pressure). So it seems apparent that exercise builds physical and psychological resilience to other events. (2)

    Mechanisms

    The mechanism of this effect is not yet fully understood, but Spalding et al (2) suggest it may by primarily due to improvements in general cardiac performance – the cardiovascular system becomes more efficient and doesn’t need to do as much work to mobilise resources in reaction to a stressor. In this way, exercise effectively raises the body’s natural ‘trigger point’ for the stress response.

    Additionally, exercise triggers the release of atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP), which has a direct effect on the body’s stress response by reducing the activation of the HPA axis. This is a route through which exercise can reduce immediate levels of stress, but there may be longer-term effects too; exercise may benefit chronic levels of stress by relaxing the resting tension level of the muscles, which can reduce chronic stress by breaking the stress-feedback loop (3).

    The body was ‘designed’ with the presumption that it would experience a certain amount of movement, and when this movement doesn’t take place, the body doesn’t perform up to spec. This is one example of many where we see that as humans are taken further from their ‘natural environment’, so to speak, various problems start to arise.

    Recommended Reading:

    References:

    (1) Blumenthal, J.A., Williams., R.S., Needels, T.L., & Wallace, A.G. (1982). Psychological changes accompany aerobic exercise in healthy middle-aged adults. Psychosomatic Medicine, 44(6), 529-536.

    (2) Spalding, T.W., Lyon, L.A., Steel, D.H., & Hatfield, B.D. (2004). Aerobic exercise training and cardiovascular reactivity to psychological stress in sedentary young normotensive men and women. Psychophysiology, 41, 552-562.

    (3) Ratey, J., & Hagerman, E. (2008). Spark. London: Quercus.

  • Is love really blind? Positive illusions in relationships

    One of the more interesting of our (many) cognitive biases are positive illusions – a tendency to be view ourselves more positively than others, be optimistic about the future, and exaggerate our perceptions of control.  Positive illusions are typically self-enhancing, but if you’ve ever seen a madly in love couple, or been a part of one, you might have the idea that maybe we project positive illusions onto other people.  And it’s true.  People in romantic relationships really do drench their partners in a wave of idealised qualities, and downplay their more annoying aspects. (1)

    A number of studies have found that people tend to rate their partners attractiveness as greater than their own (2), but there was one study in particular which was particularly ingenious. (3)  Photos were taken of couples, which were manipulated in a computer to create an array of seven faces – the real photo, three that were more attractive, and three that were less attractive (see ‘What is beauty?‘ for more on standards of attractiveness).  Participants had to identify their partners real face from the fake ones.  Couples who were satisfied with their current relationship tended to pick a more attractive face, couples who were dissatisfied tended to pick a less attractive face!

    positive_illusions
    If you look at your partner and see this, that’s an example of a positive illusion. Or an LSD high. (Credit: NaiM eL NoVaTO)

    Why does this happen though?  We’ve already seen that love can have a very powerful effect on us, perhaps these illusions help us to justify staying with a partner, just like a junkie justifies “one more hit.”  That’s an unromantic way of saying that this may just be a normal, healthy way of keeping a relationship going.  And likewise, when a relationship is going badly, the illusions disappear which again could be a way of helping us to make the right relationship choices.

    So, our mind may be responding to the amount of satisfaction in the relationship by altering our perceptions slightly, as a safeguard towards helping us stay in beneficial relationships, and against wasting time in bad relationships (when we could be looking for someone new).  And it does seem to be an effective system – one study followed couples over a 13-year period, and found that positive illusions predicted greater satisfaction with the relationship in the early stages of dating and marriage.

    So is love blind?  Perhaps not blind, but certainly partially-sighted.  However, this is not a phenomenon that is unique to love.  Our perception of reality is far from objective, particularly social reality, and positive illusions in relationships are just another illustration of the idea that we are specialised organisms rather than rational beings.  Natural selection has ‘designed’ our minds to cut the corners of logic wherever this helps us to solve our problems of survival and reproduction in a more efficient or effective way.  Well, there’s either that explanation, or the ‘love-is-magic’ Disney explanation.  Take your pick.

    References:

    (1) Murray, S., Holmes, J., & Griffin, D. (1996). The benefits of positive illusions: Idealization and the construction of satisfaction in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(1), 79-98

    (2) Swami, V., Furnham, A., Georgiades, C., & Pang, L. (2007). Evaluating self and partner physical attractiveness. Body Image, 4, 97-101.

    (3) Penton-Voak, I.S., Rowe, A.C., & Williams, J. (2007). Through rose tinted glasses: Relationship satisfaction and representations of partners facial attractiveness.  Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 5, 169-181.

  • Differential Susceptibility – Are some brains more plastic than others?

    Ever heard of the idea that for some illnesses and disorders to develop, you need to have an inherited risk factor plus environmental stress? It’s known commonly as the diathesis-stress model (diathesis basically means predisposition), and it’s a common explanation for a large range of phenomena, from schizophrenia to serial murder. Both diathesis and stress need to be present for the illness to arise.

    This has been the prevailing view for some time, but a few researchers, such as Jay Belsky and Michael Pluess of Birkbeck university, are now making a slightly different case. They don’t say that the diathesis-stress model is incorrect, rather, that it is incomplete.

    They have noted multiple instances in the existing research base in which the diathesis side of the model – for example the function of genes, or phenotypic characteristics – would be better explained as what they call ‘plasticity factors’, as opposed to ‘vulnerability factors’.

    Is the diathesis-stress model incomplete?

    Let’s look at the current viewpoint in a little more detail. Typically, certain people are thought to possess particular gene variants which make them more likely to develop a psychological condition, for example depression, when a certain conditions occur in their life. So, someone with a different allele (different versions of the same gene are known as ‘alleles’) could go through the same experiences, and not come out the other side depressed.

    The new point of view would say that rather than having a risk for certain illnesses, these people may actually have a brain that is more responsive to the environment generally. If they did not go through a stressful period, but instead a supportive, nurturing one, they would be more likely to develop beneficial psychological characteristics – and again, people who had different versions of the gene could go through the same experiences and not come out the other side as well off.

    This model is called ‘differential susceptibility’; people differ in their susceptibility to environmental influence. The implication is that some brains are more plastic than others, and are therefore more susceptible to both positive and negative effects of supportive and unsupportive environments.

    Vulnerability or Plasticity?

    Over the years a number of studies on temperament in children have been published which appeared to supported the diathesis-stress model. They generally show that differences in parenting style predict differences in self-control, externalising problems, and other aspects of difficult temperament. But the limitation of these studies is that they did not test for whether these same children would be more likely to receive benefits from different parenting styles. In other words, these studies were not designed to tell the difference between vulnerability and plasticity – only to detect vulnerability.

    temperament
    Chill out…

    A number of other studies, however, have been designed in a way that gets around this problem, and many have supported the idea of general plasticity. To give an example, one study found that teenage boys with difficult temperament were the least likely to externalise problems after 6 months with sensitive, non-controlling mothers; but they were also the most likely to externalise problems after 6 months with insensitive, controlling mothers. Furthering the support for the theory, this pattern was not found in the teenagers who did not have a difficult temperament. (2)

    Another study, this time with an experimental design, looked at mothers who were thought to be at risk of developing insecure children due to their own difficulties. These mothers were given an intervention in the form of a video feedback exercise, which successfully improved their parenting skills. Was the intervention successful in building a more secure attachment style from the infants? Yes it was, but only for those who had a high level of negative reactivity prior to the intervention. (3)

    Genetic Markers of Differential Susceptibility

    differential_susceptibility

    We’ve looked at a few studies which might demonstrate the effects of differential susceptibility in the ‘real world’. There is also some evidence looking into the effects of genes, and again Belsky and Pluess (1) argue that because previous research had been led by the diathesis-stress model, findings which might support differential susceptibility have tended to go overlooked.

    If anything I’ve said up to now has been familiar to you, you might have heard of the 5-HTTLPR gene. It has had attention in the media and popular books (eg., The How of Happiness) for being the ‘depression gene’, in that people who have a specific variant of this gene, the so called ‘short allele’, are more susceptible to depression.

    A number of studies have supported this finding, but there have been some results which suggest the pattern may not be so clear as yet. One study found, as predicted, that young adults with two short alleles had the most severe symptoms of depression when they had experienced problematic childhoods. However, when short allele children had experienced a supportive childhood, they actually showed the fewest symptoms of depression later in life. (4)

    A warm and fuzzy conclusion?

    Although the recent evidence for individual differences in plasticity is quite compelling, the authors are very tentative and cautious in their papers, which I suppose is necessary when you’re proposing something new. You don’t want to scare anyone off. So they are keen to point out that the evidence is not quite solid as yet, and there is more work to be done.

    This line of work is only beginning, and there are many unknowns. Much the same as in priming research, the evidence of the effect is running a little ahead of the understanding of the mechanisms involved, and researchers are unclear on whether differential susceptibility stems mostly from ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’, or on the breadth of the phenomena that it applies to. Having said that, the idea that that the people most susceptible to negative symptoms and experiences might be the people most susceptible to positive symptoms and experiences, is quite a cheerful thought.

    References:

    (1) Belsky, J., & Pluess, M. (2009). Beyond diathesis stress: Differential susceptibility to environmental influences. Psychological Bulletin, 135(6), 885-908

    (2) van Aken, C., Junger, M., Verhoeven, M., van Aken, M., & Dekovi?, M. (2007). The interactive effects of temperament and maternal parenting on toddlers’ externalizing behaviours. Infant and Child Development, 16(5), 553-572.

    (3) Klein Velderman, M., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M., Juffer, F., & van IJzendoorn, M. (2006). Effects of attachment-based interventions on maternal sensitivity and infant attachment: Differential susceptibility of highly reactive infants. Journal of Family Psychology, 20(2), 266-274.

    (4) Taylor, S., Way, B., Welch, W., Hilmert, C., Lehman, B., & Eisenberger, N. (2006). Early Family Environment, Current Adversity, the Serotonin Transporter Promoter Polymorphism, and Depressive Symptomatology. Biological Psychiatry, 60(7), 671-676.